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THE GRADUATE TRANSFER RULE: IS THE NCAA
UNNECESSARILY HINDERING STUDENT-ATHLETES
FROM TRAVERSING THE EDUCATIONAL
PATHS THEY DESIRE?
"If we're going to say that the goal is education, if a player has
fulfilled that part of the obligation, they got a degree, which is
what they went to college for, as well as playing ball, I think that
opportunity should be there .... That's something players can
respect. "'
I. INTRODUCTION
In April 2006, the National Collegiate Athletic Association
("NCAA") adopted legislation allowing student-athletes who had
earned their undergraduate degree and maintained eligibility in
their sport to enroll as graduate students at different institutions,
continuing their athletic participation at the new institution imme-
diately.2 As expected, the parties most impacted by the graduate
transfer rule, student-athletes, coaches, and athletic directors, ini-
tially reacted with an assortment of diverging opinions regarding
the rule's necessity and overall value. 3 In particular, critics argued
1. Mike Knobler, NCAA Rule Change Would Hinder Transfers; Tech Tackle's Future
On Line If Repeal Goes Through, ATLANTAJ.-CONST., Jan. 5, 2007, at IH [hereinafter
Knobler, NCAA Rule Change] (quoting Darryl Richard, Georgia Tech football
player supporting penalty-free transfer rule for student-athletes desiring to con-
tinue athletic and academic pursuits at graduate level).
2. See Gregg Doyel, Strange New NCAA Transfer Rule Has Everybody Saying
'What??,'CBS SPORTSLINE.COM, May 24, 2006, http://www.sportsline.com/college
basketball/story/9459096 (on file with author) (revealing details of recently-
adopted NCAA rule allowing for transfers of college graduates who remain athleti-
cally eligible and who desire to pursue graduate-level education). The rule allows
student-athletes to immediately resume their athletic career without "sitting out a
year. It's graduate, transfer and play." Id.
3. See Dave Curtis, SEC Considers Fight of Transfer Rule, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
June 1, 2006 (quoting University of Florida football coach Urban Meyer describing
rule as "loophole that needs to be closed"). But see Mark Long, Gators, Others Take
Advantage of New Graduate-Transfer Rule, ASSOcIATED PRESS, Aug. 17, 2006 [hereinaf-
ter Long, Gators, Others Take Advantage] (citing Meyer's response to rule after re-
ceiving transfer Ryan Smith from Utah as "I like it this year. I won't like it next
year."). The Vanderbilt University football program received an experienced
quarterback, Richard Kovalcheck, from the University of Arizona when Kovalcheck
decided to pursue a graduate degree there beginning in the fall of 2006. See Ron
Higgins, SEC Favors Grad-Student 'Free Agency,' KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, June 1,
2006, at D1 (discussing Vanderbilt football coach Bobby Johnson's predicted im-
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that the rule essentially created a free agency market at the col-
legiate level within the NCAA's "revenue" sports: football, men's
basketball, and ice hockey. 4 Another criticism, in addition to the
free agency argument asserted by numerous NCAA coaches, is that
the rule required the re-recruitment of student-athletes known to
desire a transfer to a new institution as a graduate student.5 Stu-
dent-athletes reacted favorably to the graduate transfer rule as a
beneficial means not only to continue their educations, but also to
attend the institutions they believe would best utilize and appreci-
ate their athletic talents. 6 Student-athletes favoring the graduate
transfer rule stress the objective of obtaining a degree as para-
mount whereas others, such as coaches and athletic directors, may
primarily revere loyalty to an institution's athletic program. 7 The
disagreement has become a moot point since representatives from
NCAA Division I institutions voted to override the graduate transfer
rule on January 6, 2007, less than one year after its adoption. 8 Al-
pact of rule as "[not] that big a deal"). Coach Johnson further approved of the
rule because, although it is difficult to receive one's bachelor's degree in just three
years, "if a guy can get to a good graduate school and finish out one last year of
eligibility, why not let him do it?" Id.
4. See Sarah M. Konsky, Comment, An Antitrust Challenge to the NCAA Transfer
Rules, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1581, 1581 (2003) (designating NCAA "revenue" sports);
see also Earl C. Dudley, Jr. & George Rutherglen, Ironies, Inconsistencies, and Intercolle-
giate Athletics: Title IX, Title VII, and Statistical Evidence of Discrimination, 1 Va. J.
Sports & L. 177, 229 (1999) (noting emergence of women's basketball as "reve-
nue" sport). To some of the rule's opponents, the ability of star student-athletes to
transfer to "higher-profile conferences .... 'encourag[es] disloyalty'" adverse to
smaller athletic programs. See Knobler, NCAA Rule Change, supra note 1 (present-
ing critics' position that rule produces eligible student-athlete "free agents").
5. See Higgins, supra note 3 (indicating University of Arkansas football coach
Houston Nutt's opinion that re-recruitment efforts are undesirable). In particular,
coaches fear a dynamic where eligible student-athletes have an upper hand over
their undergraduate athletic programs by potentially being able to transfer to a
more favorable or more competitive institution. See Josh Kendall, Transfer Rule
Leaves Coaches Concerned, MACON TELEGRAPH (Ga.),June 2, 2006 (hypothesizing sit-
uation where football player with undergraduate degree desires to play another
position and, because of leverage created by graduate transfer rule, "can threaten
to leave [undergraduate institution] if they aren't swapped.").
6. SeeJay Heater, Rule Change Gave Krieg A Chance to Play at Ca4 CONTRA COSTA
TIMES (Walnut Creek, Cal.), Aug. 11, 2006 (describing former Duke University
football player Tyler Krieg's desire to play for more-competitive University of Cali-
fornia team during his last year of athletic eligibility).
7. See Chas Davis, Give Competitive Equity a Backseat, IN THE SAAC: THE VOICE
OF THE D-1 NATIONAL STUDENT-ATHLETE ADVISORY COMMITTEE (Indianapolis, Ind.),
Summer/Fall 2006, at 6, available at http://wwwl.ncaa.org/membership/member-
ship.svcs/saac/dl/newsletter/2006DI-summer.pdf (commenting that, from stu-
dent-athlete's perspective, athletic directors' and coaches' wishes should not
override "those of the student-athlete at a critical time in their lives.").
8. See Mike Knobler, NCAA Report: Grad Transfers Must Sit A Year, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., Jan. 7, 2007, at 9E (noting repeal of rule by seventy percent to thirty per-
cent vote).
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though Division I institutions reached what could be described as a
consensus, the thirty-one-member Student-Athlete Advisory Com-
mittee ("SAAC") unanimously disagreed with the vote's outcome. 9
This Comment examines the validity of the graduate transfer
rule as utilized throughout the 2006-07 collegiate school year. 10
Section II provides an account of the rule's history, its application
by some student-athletes, and the reasons for the vote that ended its
short existence." More generally, Section II explores the structure
of the NCAA as a legislative body, as well as how a proposal such as
the graduate transfer rule becomes a bylaw of the organization. 12
Examining the "free agency of collegiate athletics" challenge as-
serted by many of the graduate transfer rule's opponents, Section
III presents an argument in favor of the rule based on free agency
and antitrust principles developed in professional sports.' 3 Finally,
Section IV concludes that the NCAA Division I institutions should
reconsider the interests of their student-athletes and re-adopt the
graduate transfer rule for a longer period of time than one aca-
demic year in order to discern the actual impact of the rule on
student-athletes and institutions alike. 14
9. See id. (indicating student committee's recommendation to voting institu-
tions at NCAA Convention); see also Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Association Gets Down
to Business - Division I Overrides Graduate Transfer Rule, THE NCAA NEWS (Indianapo-
lis, Ind.), Jan. 15, 2007, available at http://www.ncaa.org/ (follow "The NCAA
News" hyperlink; then follow "NCAA News Archive" hyperlink; then follow "2007"
hyperlink; then follow "Division I" hyperlink; then follow "Association gets down to
business - Division I overrides graduate transfer rule" hyperlink) (quoting student-
athlete advocating preservation of graduate transfer rule because "[t] he (competi-
tive) impact is minimal when compared to what student-athletes gain from contin-
uing their education.").
10. For a survey of the graduate transfer rule's short-lived availability to eligi-
ble graduate student-athletes wishing to transfer, see infra notes 92-113 and accom-
panying text.
11. For a discussion of the history of the graduate transfer rule and specific
instances of student-athletes who took advantage of the rule, see infra notes 92-126
and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of NCAA governance and the organization's legislative
process, see infra notes 18-44 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the free agency and antitrust aspects of the graduate
transfer rule, see infra notes 127-42 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the graduate transfer rule's beneficial role in encour-
aging student-athletes to pursue both academic and athletic interests to their ful-
lest potential, see infra notes 114-26 and accompanying text.
2008]
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II. BACKGROUND
A. NCAA Overview, Purpose, and Functions
The 101-year-old NCAA currently maintains a membership of
1,281 institutions spanning three divisions. 15 This Comment fo-
cuses on the graduate transfer rule's applicability to Division I,
which encompasses the most prominent college athletic pro-
grams.' 6 During the 2004-05 academic year, 384,742 student-ath-
letes from NCAA institutions participated in NCAA championship
sports. 17 The NCAA operates similarly in structure to a corporation
through the NCAA Council, Executive Committee, and President's
Commission. 18 Considered the organization's ruling body, the
NCAA Council "consists of a president, secretary-treasurer, and
forty-four institutional representatives who set general policy and
oversee the various committees."'19 The twenty-person Executive
Committee sits atop the hierarchy of the Association-wide commit-
tees, "composed of institutional chief executive officers that oversee
Association-wide issues."'20 The Committee oversees the NCAA's
three divisions, ensuring that each functions according to the or-
ganization's principles, purposes, and policies. 21 Lastly, the forty-
15. See NCAA Membership Breakdown, http://wwwl.ncaa.org/membership/
membershipsvcs/membership-breakdown.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2007) (or-
ganizing member institutions arranged by division as of September 1, 2007). Divi-
sion I, Division I and Division III base their memberships according to factors
such as "the number of sports offered at the institution, and whether and to what
extent athletic scholarships are available." Sean M. Hanlon, Comment, Athletic
Scholarships as Unconscionable Contracts of Adhesion: Has the NCAA Fouled Out?, 13
SPORTS LAW. J. 41, 48 (2006); see also Ray Yasser & Clay Fees, Comment, Attacking
the NCAA "s Anti-Transfer Rules as Covenants Not to Compete, 15 SETON HALL J. SPORTS
& ENT. L. 221, 223 (2005) (breaking down NCAA football divisions); see generally
Michael Aguirre, From Locker Rooms to Legislatures: Student-Athletes Turn Outside the
Game to Improve the Score, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1441, 1444 (2004) (describing NCAA's
1973 "trifurcat[ion] [of] intercollegiate athletics").
16. See NCAA Membership Breakdown, supra note 15 (indicating that Division
I membership includes 384 institutions).
17. See NCAA Miscellaneous Facts and Figures, http://www.ncaa.org/about/
fact.sheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2007) (specifying total student-athlete partici-
pants organized by gender and race). Of the 384,742 student-athlete participants
in 2004-05, 219,744 were male student-athletes and 164,998 were female student-
athletes. See id. Of the Division I student-athlete participants in 200-04, 79,541
received grants-in-aid during the academic year. See id.
18. See Hanlon, supra note 15, at 48 (analogizing NCAA structure to large
business organization).
19. Konsky, supra note 4, at 1582 (describing composition of Council).
20. NCAA Executive Committee, http://www.ncaa.org/ (follow "Legislation
& Governance" hyperlink; then follow "Committees - Association-wide" hyperlink;
then follow "NCAA Executive Committee" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 24, 2007).
21. See id. (describing Executive Committee's supervisory role as NCAA's
highest governance body).
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four member President's Commission maintains a supervisory role
over the organization "conducts studies of intercollegiate athletics
issues with the purpose of gaining knowledge to urge certain
courses of action, and proposes legislation. '2 2
A heavily regulated organization, the NCAA administers many
different areas within its ever-growing sets of rules, including regu-
lation of athletic competitions, athletic eligibility rules, recruitment
process guidelines, athletic championship events and tournaments,
television contracts, and licensing agreements. 23 With respect to
television contracts alone, the NCAA 2006-07 budget reflects televi-
sion and marketing rights revenue of more than $508 million. 24
The NCAA also regulates how student-athletes can be compensated
for their services. 25
1. The Legislative Function
The NCAA employs a legislation process in order "to promote
student-athlete welfare." 26 Each NCAA division maintains its own
bylaws, which reflect legislation providing "rules and regulations
not inconsistent with the provisions of the [NCAA] constitu-
22. Hanlon, supra note 15, at 48 (referencing 2004-05 NCAA Division I Man-
ual, art. 4.5.3-4.5.3.7 (July 2004), available at http://www.ncaa.org/library/mem-
bership/division-iLmanual/2004-05/2004-05_dl_manual.pdf).
23. See id. at 47 (cataloging extensive NCAA rules and regulations in various
aspects of college athletics).
24. See The National Collegiate Athletic Association Revised Budget for Fiscal
Year Ended August 31, 2007, http://wwwl.ncaa.org/finance/2006-07_budget.pdf
(last visited Oct. 24, 2007) (indicating roughly 90% of total NCAA operating reve-
nue reflects television and marketing rights); see also Konsky, supra note 4, at 1584
(deeming NCAA "a major commercial entity").
25. See Aguirre, supra note 15, at 1458 (defining "grant-in-aid" as "tuition and
fees, room and board, and required course-related books" (quoting 2004-05 NCAA
Division I Manual, supra note 22, at art. 15.02.5)). The maximum amount a stu-
dent-athlete can receive as a grant-in-aid typically differs slightly from the amount
of a full scholarship covering a student's complete attendance cost. See id. Accord-
ing to the NCAA, the organization "awards up to 174 postgraduate scholarships
annually, 87 for men and 87 for women." NCAA Postgraduate Scholarship Pro-
gram, http://wwwl .ncaa.org/membership/edoutreach/profidevelopment/post-
grad-scholarships.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2007) (specifying that such
scholarships, granted to student-athletes three times per year for each athletic sea-
son, are "one-time, non-renewable grants" of $7,500). To be eligible for a post-
graduate scholarship, a student-athlete must be nominated by a faculty athletics
representative during their last season of athletic eligibility, maintain a certain
grade point average, and "[i]ntend to continue academic work beyond the bacca-
laureate degree . . . [as] a part- or full-time [graduate student]." Id. (follow "Who
is Eligible?" hyperlink).
26. NCAA, Legislation & Governance, http://www.ncaa.org/ (follow "Legisla-
tion & Governance" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 24, 2007) (describing organiza-
tion's governing bodies-including Student-Athlete Advisory Committees-and
purposes in enacting NCAA legislation).
2008]
5
Martin: The Graduate Transfer Rule: Is the NCAA Unnecessarily Hindering S
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2008
108 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL.
tion .. ."27 When adopting or amending the NCAA bylaws, the
Management Council initially reviews the proposal and approves,
defeats, or forwards it to the membership for review. 28 Next, assum-
ing the proposal survives initial review and membership review, the
Management Council votes to send the NCAA Board of Directors
the proposal after considering any reactions or suggestions.2 9 The
Board of Directors receives the proposed legislative changes and
can adopt the measure with a majority vote of present-voting mem-
bers. 30 Dissatisfied member institutions may "override" a legislative
change or "the failure of a legislative change," if at least thirty mem-
ber institutions request such a measure within sixty days of the
Board's vote.3 ' Receiving enough override requests triggers further
review by the Board of Directors, as the body convenes to evaluate
the legislative decision and to vote once again to determine the po-
tential change in position. 32 To override the Board's legislative ac-
tion, a five-eighths majority of member institutions must vote
accordingly at the annual NCAA Convention, "based on the princi-
ple of one institution, one vote."3 3 If the voting member institu-
27. 2006-07 NCAA Division I Manual, Constitution, art. 5.2.2 (July 2006),
available at http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/divisioni_manual/2006-
07/2006-07dl manual.pdf [hereinafter NCAA Const.]. The rules and regula-
tions dictated by the NCAA Operating Bylaws include, but are not to be limited to:
(a) The administration of intercollegiate athletics by members of the
Association;
(b) The establishment and control of NCAA championship (games,
matches, meets and tournaments) and other athletic events sponsored or
sanctioned by the Association;
(c) The procedures for administering and enforcing the provisions of the
constitution and bylaws; and
(d) The adoption of rules of play and competition in the various sports,
and the delegation of authority in connection with such subjects to indi-
viduals, officers and committees.
Id.
28. See id. at art. 5.3.2.2.1 (listing options of Management Council during "Ini-
tial Review" stage of adopting or amending bylaws).
29. See Hanlon, supra note 15, at 51 (noting that Management Council's ap-
proval results in notification of proposal to all NCAA member institutions).
30. See NCAA Const., supra note 27, at art. 5.3.2.2.3 ("A proposed change shall
be considered adopted if it receives the favorable vote of a majority of those Board
members present and voting."); see also id. at art. 5.3.2.2.2.1 (noting that if Board
makes substantial changes to proposal that "increase[ ] the modification beyond
that initially approved," Board must return proposal to Council to allow for review
and comment by member institutions "before taking final action").
31. See id. at art. 5.3.2.3.1 (describing membership "override" process).
NCAA conferences may file override requests on behalf of their multiple member
institutions. See id.
32. See id. at art. 5.3.2.3.2 (noting that if Board's decision remains unchanged,
active member institutions next vote on proposed legislation).
33. See id. at art. 5.3.2.3.3 (indicating NCAA membership's mechanism to
override legislation, trumping Board of Director's prior vote).
[Vol. 15: p. 103
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tions fail to deliver the required five-eighths majority, the legislation
is implemented. 34
In addition to these contours of the NCAA legislative process
affecting student-athlete welfare, peer advocacy has recently been
implemented. 35 Student-Athlete Advisory Committees ("SAACs")
were established "to review and offer student-athlete input on
NCAA activities and proposed legislation that affected student-ath-
lete welfare." 36 In 1997, the NCAA-wide SAAC grew into three sepa-
rate, more specific organizations reflecting the three NCAA
divisions.3 7 Today, the NCAA bylaws contain regulations involving
the SAAC,38 which reports directly to the NCAA Management
Council, as well as mandate that NCAA institutions maintain their
own SAACs on campus. 39 National SAACs strive "to enhance the
total student-athlete experience by promoting opportunity, protect-
ing student-athlete welfare and fostering a positive student-athlete
image."40 Selection of SAAC members is subject to final approval
by the NCAA Management Council upon recommendation by the
SAAC. 41 NCAA bylaws provide that two SAAC student-athlete rep-
resentatives will be designated to attend and participate at each
Management Council meeting; however, these representatives
"shall be nonvoting members." 42 Arguably, the SAAC's existence
provides a check on the NCAA from implementing legislation with-
out student-athlete input by encouraging engagement and re-
34. See Hanlon, supra note 15, at 51-52 (detailing legislation's survival of Con-
vention override vote).
35. See NCAA Student-Athlete Advisory Committees, http://wwwl.ncaa.org/
membership/membership-svcs/saac/index.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2007) (re-
flecting on 1989 adoption of committees to "provide insight" on student-athlete
experience).
36. Id.
37. See id. (discussing expansion of Student-Athlete Advisory Committees
("SAAC") after eight years in existence).
38. See 2006-07 NCAA Division I Manual, Operating Bylaws, art. 21.7.7.5 (July
2006), available at http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/division-i manual/
2006-07/2006-07 dl-manual.pdf [hereinafter NCAA Bylaws] (proscribing compo-
sition, term of office, role with Management Council, and duties of SAAC).
39. See NCAA Const., supra note 27, at art. 6.1.4 ("Each institution shall estab-
lish a student-athlete advisory committee for its student-athletes. The composition
and the duties of the committee shall be determined by the institution.").
40. NCAA Student-Athlete Advisory Committees, supra note 35.
41. See Aguirre, supra note 15, at 1448-49 (presenting communication with
NCAA Director of Membership Services regarding standards used when determin-
ing acceptance of SAAC nominees or recommendations).
42. NCAA Bylaws, supra note 38, at art. 21.7.7.5.3.
20081
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sponse to proposed legislation.43 Nevertheless, some SAACs at
individual institutions lack cohesion due to weak and unfocused
NCAA bylaws and "provide for virtually no student-athlete influence
or empowerment.
44
2. Amateurism
Striking an appropriate balance between educational develop-
ment and athletic integrity reflects a core concept advocated by the
NCAA's mission of guiding hundreds of thousands of student-ath-
letes in their pursuit of higher education. 45 The NCAA cites its pur-
pose of integrating "intercollegiate athletics into higher education
so that the educational experience of the student-athlete is para-
mount."46 Stated differently, the NCAA aims to utilize such an inte-
gration "to promote and develop educational leadership, physical
fitness, athletics excellence and athletics participation as a recrea-
tional pursuit. '47 In particular, the NCAA stresses amateurism-the
idea that intercollegiate athletics explicitly differ from professional
sports-as central to its intentions. 48 Amateurism reflects educa-
tional and moral qualities, arguably absent from professional
sports, that the NCAA seeks to instill in all student-athletes. 49 Refer-
ences to amateurism can be found throughout the NCAA Operat-
ing Bylaws, with Article 12 being the most relevant provision. 50
43. See Aguirre, supra note 15, at 1449 (indicating Division I SAAC's stated
purpose of "solicit[ing] student-athlete response to proposed NCAA legislation"
(quoting NCAA Student-Athlete Advisory Committees, supra note 35)).
44. Id.
45. See NCAA, Our Mission, http://www2.ncaa.org/portal/about-ncaa/over-
view/mission.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2007) (outlining NCAA's core ideology,
purpose, and values).
46. Id.
47. NCAA Const., supra note 27, at art. 1.2(a).
48. See Konsky, supra note 4, at 1583-84 (indicating history of NCAA's primary
focus and eventual enforcement). In order to clearly differentiate college athletics
from professional sports, the NCAA regulates areas such as student-athlete pay-
ment, employment during the school year, and grant size, as well as maintaining "a
regulation mandating that athletes cannot retain eligibility once they sign with an
agent." Id. at 1584.
49. See Kristin R. Muenzen, Comment, Weakening It's [sic] Own Defense? The
NCAA's Version of Amateurism, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 257, 261-62 (2003) (indicat-
ing amateurism's presence at college level). Specifically, the NCAA purports "to
maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program
and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a
clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional
sports." NCAA Const., supra note 27, at art. 1.3.1.
50. See Marc Jenkins, Comment, The United Student-Athletes of America: Should
College Athletes Organize in Order to Protect Their Rights and Address the Ills of Intercollegi-
ate Athletics?, 5 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAc. 39, 43 (2003) (discussing NCAA's gov-
erning document referencing amateurism). Article 12.01.2 indicates that the
[Vol. 15: p. 103
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That bylaw, in general, establishes the basic premise that amateur
student-athletes are entitled to compete athletically in the NCAA;
however, a student-athlete's amateur status depends on fulfilling a
host of assorted provisions involving financial aid receipt, expenses,
awards, and various benefits.5 ' For example, under Article 15 of
the Operating Bylaws, a student-athlete who receives improper fi-
nancial aid becomes ineligible to participate in intercollegiate ath-
letics.52 Additionally, student-athletes are not allowed to accept a
promise of payment or sign contracts of commitment dealing with
any activities pursued after the conclusion of their collegiate ath-
letic eligibility, such as playing professional sports.53 Interestingly,
student-athletes are permitted to maintain amateur status in one
sport while participating as a professional in another.54 In light of,
or perhaps despite, that interesting loophole, student-athletes may
not receive "a salary, reimbursement of expenses or any other form
of financial assistance from a professional sports organization." 55
Critics challenge the actual value of amateurism's goal of stu-
dent-athlete achievement due to the large amount of revenue the
NCAA earns each year. 56 Many argue that the NCAA amateurism
NCAA considers student-athletes an "integral part of the student body, thus main-
taining a clear line of demarcation between college athletics and professional
sports." NCAA Bylaws, supra note 38, at art. 12.01.2.
51. SeeJenkins, supra note 50, at 43 (describing guidelines dealing with ama-
teur status as "cumbersome and vague").
52. See NCAA Bylaws, supra note 38, at art. 15.01.2 (indicating penalty for re-
ceipt of improper financial aid). Numerous other provisions included in Article
15 of the operating bylaws spell out specifics involving the required conformity
financial aid must have to the organization's rules of amateurism. See Jenkins,
supra note 50, at 44 (suggesting employment at-will relationship between student-
athletes and collegiate institutions due to contours of various grant-in-aid renewal
rules).
53. See NCAA Bylaws, supra note 38, at art. 12.1.2(b)-(c) (providing two of
seven ways student-athletes can lose amateur status and thereby lose eligibility for
intercollegiate competition).
54. See id. at art. 12.1.3 (stating that dual-sport athletes, even though partici-
pating in one sport professionally, may also receive financial aid for the other col-
legiate sport); see a/soJenkins, supra note 50, at 44 n.105 (revealing most common
situation entails minor league baseball player competing in anouier sport during
school year).
55. NCAA Bylaws, supra note 38, at art. 12.1.2(d). The bylaw provision seems
to indicate that Article 12.1.3, which provides for the dual student-athlete-and-pro-
fessional situation, constitutes an exception; however, one scholar has indicated
that the provision prohibiting financial assistance from a professional organization
seems contradictory to the thrust of amateurism. SeeJenkins, supra note 50, at 44
("Since NCAA rules allow athletes to be a professional in one sport while maintain-
ing amateur status in another, these rules seem contradictory and hypocritical.").
56. See Muenzen, supra note 49, at 262 (commenting "[t]he commercial as-
pect of college athletics - television contracts and bowl game revenue, for example
- counteracts the nonprofit, amateur motives of the [NCAA].")
2008]
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rule violates United States antitrust law, specifically the Sherman
Act,57 because the organization and its member institutions pro-
hibit student-athletes from engaging in activities relevant to a pro-
fessional career, such as consultation with sports agents and
entering professional drafts, as well as from sharing revenue gener-
ated by intercollegiate competition. 58 Generally, courts have either
failed to invalidate the rules under antitrust law or have determined
that the Sherman Act is inapplicable to NCAA amateurism rules. 59
The Supreme Court, in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma,60 held that NCAA rules are subject to antitrust scrutiny
and should be upheld if they foster economic competition. 61 Dis-
cussing amateurism, the Court described the television plan at issue
as fostering "the goal of amateurism by spreading revenues among
various schools and reducing the financial incentives toward profes-
sionalism." 62 Because the amateurism rules are non-commercial in
nature and strive to sustain NCAA athletics, courts are reluctant to
accept a challenge based on antitrust laws.63 Despite criticism over
the NCAA's massive generation of profit,64 which is one of the or-
ganization's paramount activities, one can make a strong case re-
garding the importance of amateurism in the lives of student-
athletes, as evidenced by those who desire to continue their educa-
tions beyond receipt of their undergraduate degree.65
57. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2007) (stating "[e]very contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce .. .is
hereby declared to be illegal.").
58. SeeJenkins, supra note 50, at 45 (indicating that challenges to amateurism
rules resting on antitrust grounds have failed in courts).
59. See id. (suggesting reasons for unsuccessful pursuit of antitrust claims
before courts).
60. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
61. SeeJenkins, supra note 50, at 45 (discussing holding of case dealing exclu-
sively with NCAA rights to televise intercollegiate football games).
62. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85, 135 (1984).
63. SeeJenkins, supra note 50, at 45 (indicating lower federal case decisions
which rely on notion that amateurism rules are "necessary to preserve intercollegi-
ate athletics.").
64. See id. at 46 (suggesting that NCAA amateurism rules are inconsistent with
present-day state of intercollegiate athletic affairs). The NCAA's projected budget
for the 2006-07 academic year anticipated roughly $563 million in revenue, with
over $500 million of that money stemming from the organization's television con-
tract with CBS. See Steve Wieberg, NCAA 's Tax Status Questioned; Congressman Asks
for Response About Exemption, USA TODAY, Oct. 5, 2006, at 3C.
65. See Muenzen, supra note 49, at 262-63 ("College sports can provide an
important educational opportunity to the student-athletes .... Played with integ-
rity and in line with the educational mission of our schools, college sports can
serve both as entertainment and even as educational lessons for our broader soci-
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B. NCAA Transfer Rules
1. The Mechanics of the Transfer Rules
The NCAA Constitution contains, among many other provi-
sions, rules governing the process by which student-athletes transfer
from one institution to another.66 Specifically, the regulations ap-
plicable to transfer are found in Article 14.5.67 Generally stated,
the NCAA mandates that those student-athletes participating in
"revenue" sports wishing to transfer to another Division I institution
must sit out one year of athletic eligibility, fulfilling a "residency"
obligation at the new institution.68 After transferring, student-ath-
letes maintain their athletic eligibility without losing one of their
four years; however, student-athletes have a five-year window in
which to conclude their athletic careers. 6 9 The NCAA, however,
grants student-athletes participating in non-'revenue" sports a "one-
time transfer exception," which provides for a transfer without the
penalty of sitting out one year of athletic eligibility at the new
institution.7 0
The NCAA transfer rule more severely impacts those partici-
pating in Division I men's and women's basketball, football, and ice
hockey, as transferring student-athletes playing other sports are not
penalized by their move under the rule's exception. 7' Justifying its
transfer policy, the NCAA rationalizes that "[lt] o be a true student-
athlete, you'll need a basic academic foundation before you are eli-
ety." (quoting JAMES J. DUDERSTADT, INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS AND THE AMERI-
CAN UNrVERSITY at ix (University of Michigan Press 2000))).
66. See NCAA Bylaws, supra note 38 (indicating source of relevant bylaws).
67. See Yasser & Fees, supra note 15, at 224 (stating that Article 14 generally
governs athlete eligibility).
68. See id. at 224-25 (explaining contours of "[o]ne-[t]ime [t]ransfer
[e]xception" as applied to student-athletes not required to sit out year when
transferring).
69. See Konsky, supra note 4, at 1586 (suggesting that student-athletes looking
to exercise full athletic eligibility can transfer only one time).
70. See Aguirre, supra note 15, at 1465 (providing general rule applicable to
majority of student-athletes wishing to transfer from one four-year institution to
another). A student-athlete can utilize the one-time transfer exception provided
they transfer "1) from one four-year institution to another; 2) to play a sport other
than ['revenue' sport]; 3) from one four-year institution to another for the first
time; 4) while in good academic standing at the current institution." Id.; see also
NCAA Bylaws, supra note 38, at art. 14.5.5.2.10 (listing requirements of one-time
transfer exception).
71. See id. (speculating that NCAA regulations discourage student-athletes
from transferring because penalty is relatively severe); see also Yasser & Fees, supra
note 15, at 226 ("[T]he NCAA has set up a 'price' which must be paid by athletes
engaged in the specified sports if they want to transfer.").
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gible to play sports."72 In addition, the NCAA maintains an interest
in guaranteeing a relatively uniform competitive atmosphere
whereby all of its institutions, particularly those consistently con-
tending for championships in the more lucrative and prominent
sports of football and men's basketball,73 are not able to easily lure
transfer student-athletes away from the institutions that originally
recruited them.74 Lastly, coaches and athletic directors prefer a
somewhat restrictive transfer system that forces student-athletes
contemplating a change of institution to consider the system's de-
terrents. 75 For example, University of Arkansas men's basketball
coach Stan Heath initially reacted to learning about the graduate
transfer rule by stating that, from an academic perspective, a stu-
dent-athlete "gets rewarded, but in some ways it penalizes [an insti-
tution's] program. As a coach, now you're thinking that maybe
your players shouldn't take so many summer courses, that you
might want to slow down the progress toward a degree a bit."7 6
Heath's remark succinctly summarizes the contrasting attitudes pre-
sent between student-athletes and coaches.
72. 2006-07 NCAA Transfer 101, 6 (Feb. 2007), available at http://www.ncaa.
org/library/general/transfer-guide/2006-07/2006-07_transfer-guide.pdf. In Mc-
Hale v. Cornell University, the NCAA defended its transfer policy on the ground that
the organization wished to dissuade transfers "solely for athletic reasons," as well as
to allow for adjustment time in a new environment free of added pressure. 620 F.
Supp. 67, 68 n.4 (N.D.N.Y. 1985); see also Konsky, supra note 4, at 1587 (citing
NCAA's rationale as "not without merit").
73. See Rodney K. Smith & Robert D. Walker, Comment, From Inequity to Oppor-
tunity: Keeping the Promises Made to Big-Time Intercollegiate Student-Athletes, 1 NEV. L.J.
160, 161 (2001) (deeming football and men's basketball "big-time" intercollegiate
athletics because of teams' substantial, multi-million dollar profits). "Other men's
and women's sports at all levels typically are not profitable. Indeed, it is clear that
funds generated by profitable Division I-A men's basketball and football programs
are being diverted to cover expenses generated by nonrevenue-producing pro-
grams." Id.
74. See Yasser & Fees, supra note 15, at 226 (speculating that NCAA's goal "is
to ensure that Division I talent in the major revenue generating sports is spread
uniformly throughout the NCAA Division I membership to protect competitive
balance.").
75. See id. at 227 (suggesting that NCAA's transfer rules "empower coaches"
who are generally confident rules will deter student-athletes from transferring).
76. Higgins, supra note 3. Recognizing this quandary, Tennessee women's
basketball coach Pat Summit noted that any kind of coaching technique designed
to discourage student-athletes from rapidly completing their academic require-
ments "would contradict what we're trying to do - encourage them to excel aca-
demically. You'd think, 'Wait a minute. If I do this, you're leaving me. No, don't
leave me.'" Jon Solomon, Transfer Rule Under Scrutiny; NCAA Vote Allows Grad Stu-
dents to Move, BIRMINGHAM NEWS (Ala.), June 1, 2006, at 1C.
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2. Tanaka i,. University of Southern California: An Unsuccessful
Antitrust Challenge to the NCAA Transfer Rules
In Tanaka v. University of Southern California,77 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ("Ninth Circuit") affirmed a lower
court decision to dismiss a student-athlete's suit challenging, on an-
titrust grounds, a Pacific-10 ("Pac-10") Conference rule discourag-
ing transfers to member institutions.78 The Pac-10 transfer rule
required a student-athlete transferring from one conference institu-
tion to another to "fulfill a residence requirement of two full aca-
demic years" and required the student-athlete's new institution to
"charge the student with two years of eligibility in all Pacific-10
sports. '79 During this period of ineligibility, the student-athlete's
new institution was prohibited from "offer[ing], provid[ing], or ar-
rang[ing]... any... athletically related financial aid. °80 In Tanaka,
a women's soccer player at the University of Southern California
("USC") was dissatisfied with the athletic and academic programs at
that institution and chose to transfer to another Pac-10 institution,
the University of California, Los Angeles ("UCLA").81 The District
Court for the Central District of California held that the Pac-10
transfer rule was noncommercial in nature; therefore, relevant anti-
trust law was inapplicable to the facts of the case. 82
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit took a different stance; it began
its analysis by subjecting the Pac-10 transfer rule to federal antitrust
law because of the rule's involvement with commercial activity.8 3
To succeed, the student-athlete had to demonstrate that the Pac-10
transfer rule encouraged "'significant anticompetitive effects'
within a 'relevant market. "84 The court held that the transfer rule
77. 252 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2001).
78. See id. at 1065 (dismissing plaintiffs claim because sh failed to allege that
challenged transfer rule had significant anticompetitive effect in defined geo-
graphic and product markets).
79. See id. at 1061 (citing Pacific 10 ("Pac-10") Rule C 8-3-b).
80. Id.
81. See id. (relaying factual circumstances of suit against University of South-
ern California).
82. See Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1062 (noting district court's reasoning that trans-
fer rule "is more tied to defendants' noncommercial rather than commercial activ-
ities."). Further, the district court stated that even if the plaintiff's claim could
satisfy the "commercial" hurdle and trigger implication of the Sherman Act, she
would likely lose because the rule of reason would not regard the transfer rule as
unreasonable. See id. (referring to district court's dicta that transfer rule probably
would not be "unreasonable under the rule of reason").
83. See id. ("For purposes of our analysis, we assume, without deciding, that
the transfer rule is subject to the federal antitrust laws.").
84. See id. at 1063 (quoting Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315,
1319 (9th Cir. 1996)).
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did not cause actual harm to the student-athlete's market, defined
as women's soccer in the city of Los Angeles, specifically because
she asserted that the enforcement of the rule arose as "an isolated
act of retaliation" against her personal decision to transfer to an-
other Pac-10 institution.8 5 Moreover, "the Pac-10 transfer rule ap-
plies only to intraconference transfers; it has no application to
student-athletes who transfer to non-member institutions. '8 6 De-
spite some elucidation regarding the challenge of an intercollegiate
transfer rule, Tanaka failed to address larger antitrust issues at
stake, such as whether similar transfer rules are commercial in na-
ture enough to require antitrust scrutiny.8 7
One final relevant aspect of Tanaka found the Ninth Circuit
drawing a loose analogy between "restrictions on student-athlete
transfers" and National Football League ("NFL") free agency re-
strictions which, in Mackey v. National Football League,88 did not sur-
vive antitrust analysis. 89 The court in Tanaka distinguished between
the Pac-10 transfer rule and the "Rozelle Rule" present in Mackey, as
the latter applied to all NFL players and substantially restricted the
relevant market.90 Finally, the Ninth Circuit indicated that even if a
student-athlete could successfully draw an adequate analogy to the
situation of the NFL players in Mackey, the relevant geographic and
product markets allegedly affected by a restrictive transfer rule
would have to be broad enough to survive analysis.9 1
C. The "Graduate Transfer Rule": From Proposal to Repeal
Proposal 2005-54, which emerged as a recommendation by the
NCAA Academics/Eligibility/ Compliance Cabinet in June, 2005,
intended "[t] o permit a student-athlete who is enrolled in a specific
85. See id. at 1064 (indicating that plaintiff merely asserted personal injury to
herself, not to ascertainable market).
86. Id. (discussing plaintiffs failure to show UCLA was only available option
for women's soccer players in her situation).
87. See Konsky, supra note 4, at 1593 (recognizing that Ninth Circuit failed to
address issue of "whether transfer rules affecting larger, high-revenue markets-
such as NCAA men's football nationally-could have an anticompetitive impact.").
88. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
89. See Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1063 (indicating that NFL free agency restrictions
failed antitrust "rule of reason" analysis).
90. See id. at 1064-65 ("[U]nlike the Pac-10 transfer rule, the 'Rozelle Rule
applied to every NFL player regardless of his status. . . .'" (quoting Mackey v. NFL,
543 F.2d 606, 622 (8th Cir. 1977))); see also Mackey, 543 F.2d at 620 (stating that
NFL rule discouraged players from seeking free agency, among other deterrents).
91. See Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1065 (describing plaintiffs failure to allege effect
on "properly defined geographic and product market"); see also Konsky, supra note
4, at 1594 (contending that courts should rely upon precedent dealing with profes-
sional sports antitrust issues when faced with collegiate sports situation).
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graduate degree program of an institution other than the institu-
tion from which he or she previously received a baccalaureate de-
gree to participate in intercollegiate athletics, regardless of any
previous transfer."92 The proposal purported to amend Article
14.1.9 of the NCAA Operating Bylaws by revising the language spe-
cifically contained in Article 14.1.9.1, entitled "Graduate Student in
Specific Degree Program Transfer Exception," which can be found
in the 2006-07 NCAA Division I Manual. 93 On April 27, 2006, the
NCAA Board of Directors adopted Proposal 2005-54 after much
consideration; 94 however, during the override period, forty-six
NCAA institutions-enough to trigger an override-requested that
a vote occur at the 2007 NCAA Convention. 95 The call for a final
consideration of the graduate transfer rule by Division I institutions
was only the second override vote in the history of the NCAA.96 In
92. NCAA Proposal No. 2005-54 - Eligibility - Graduate Student or Postbac-
calaureate Participation - Transfer Eligibility, http://wwwl.ncaa.org/member-
ship/governance/divisionl/management council/2007/January/22.htm (last
visited Oct. 24, 2007) [hereinafter NCAA Transfer Eligibility Proposal]. "The Divi-
sion I Academics/Eligibility/ Compliance Cabinet shall consist of 42 members, in-
cluding 22 representing [the Football Subdivision] . . . and one representative
from each Divisions I and [Football Championship Subdivision] conference... [as
well as] [t]wo financial aid officers." Division I Academics/Eligibility/Compliance
Cabinet, http://web1.ncaa.org/commitees/committees-roster.jsp?Committee
Name=AECCABINET (last visited Oct. 24, 2007) (delineating breakdown of Cabi-
net). The Cabinet unanimously championed the proposal, stating that "student-
athletes that complete their degrees and have eligibility remaining should be able
to transfer and enroll in the graduate program of their choice without NCAA
transfer restrictions." NCAA Transfer Eligibility Proposal, supra.
93. See NCAA Bylaws, supra note 38, at art. 14.1.9.1. The amended text of
Article 14.1.9.1 in existence during the 2006-07 academic year read:
A graduate student-athlete who is enrolled in a specific degree program
in a graduate or professional school of an institution other than the insti-
tution from which he or she previously received a baccalaureate degree
may participate in intercollegiate athletics, provided the student-athlete
has eligibility remaining and such participation occurs within the applica-
ble five-year period set forth in Bylaw 14.2 (see also Bylaw 14.1.8.2.1.4).
Id.
94. See NCAA Transfer Eligibility Proposal, supra note 92 (reflecting vote to
adopt by thirteen to four margin among present Board members); see also Ray
Melick, How Nice to See the Coaches Squirm, BiRMINGHAM NEWS (Ala.),June 10, 2006,
at IE (specifying date NCAA passed measure).
95. See NCAA Transfer Eligibility Proposal, supra note 92 (providing overview
of proposal's history leading to successful override vote by member institutions);
see also Few Take Advantage of Graduate-Transfer Rule, THE NCAA NEWS (Indian-
apolis, Ind.), Dec. 7, 2006, http://wbca.org/upload/DILegislationDec06Grad
Transfer.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2007) (specifying number of NCAA member in-
stitutions calling for override of graduate transfer legislation).
96. See Ken Tysiac, Have Degree; Will Transfer, THE CHARLOT-rE OBSERVER, Aug.
23, 2006 (noting rarity of override votes by Division I institutions). The five-
eighths majority of institutions voting at the January NCAA Legislative Forum was
enough to override the rule. See Elton Alexander, How It Works, PLAIN DEALER REP.
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response to the rule's adoption, some coaches immediately reacted
with disfavor, while others initially withheld judgment, stating that
they required more information about the graduate transfer rule.9 7
Of the latter group, University of Tennessee football coach Phillip
Fulmer cautiously indicated approval of a student-athlete using the
graduate transfer rule to move from a more high-profile institution
to a smaller one offering the opportunity of more playing time, al-
though he also believed that student-athletes from small schools
"transfer[ing] in [to] play for a national championship... could
take a lot of planning. So I think we need to sort through it a little
bit more."9 8
During the summer of 2006, prior to the eventual repeal of the
graduate transfer rule, an editorial appeared in the Division I Na-
tional Student-Athlete Advisory Committee newsletter devoted to
"competitive equity" and its potential ruin in the wake of the trans-
fer legislation. 99 Instead of joining the criticism of the rule, Chas
Davis, the editorial's author, characterized the graduate transfer
rule as having a positive impact on student-athletes, particularly in
light of the goals and commitments the NCAA normally under-
takes) 00 Davis indicated that only a slight risk of abuse of the rule
could exist, as non-recruitment regulations would be enforced until
the NCAA granted a student-athlete the permission to transfer. 101
In closing, Davis' argument echoed the consensus of many NCAA
student-athletes: at a pivotal time in student-athletes' lives, the
choices they make regarding their educational path must overcome
(Cleveland, Ohio), Dec. 12, 2006, at D8 (discussing legislation's future in hands of
voting institutions in early 2007).
97. See Antony A. English, SEC Coaches Aren't Sold on Transfer Rule, ST. PETERS-
BURG TIMES (Fla.), Aug. 2, 2006, at IC (indicating "[c] oaches generally fall into two
categories: those who want more information to form an opinion; and those who
already have decided the rule is a bad idea.").
98. Id. (quoting football coach desiring more information of ramifications of
use of graduate transfer rule before deciding on its worth).
99. See Davis, supra note 7, at 6 (answering claims from coaches and others
deeming graduate transfer rule vehicle of unfairness).
100. See id. (stating graduate transfer rule reflects fundamental purpose of
collegiate pursuits). "Correct me if I'm wrong, but the goal of the recently imple-
mented Academic Progress Report was to hold institutions accountable for educat-
ing student-athletes and keeping them on track to graduate." Id. In addition,
Davis maintained that "[r]egardless of the intentions of [student-athletes'] transfer
or any unintended consequences, we're talking about another major step in many
student-athletes' lives and careers." Id.
101. See id. (indicating downside of top athletic program losing valuable team
member to smaller, yet more academically appealing institution).
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the biases of coaches and athletic directors concerned about
loyalty. 102
At the Convention, held on January 6, 2007, seventy percent of
Division I institutions voted in favor of overturning the graduate
transfer rule.10 3 Speaking on behalf of the Student-Athlete Advi-
sory Committee, Boise State University student-athlete Katie Street
advised the voting institutions that voting to override the rule would
hinder the educational benefits provided to student-athletes
throughout the 2006-07 academic year. 10 4 Despite Ms. Street's ap-
peal from a student-athlete's perspective, the passing of the over-
ride pleased numerous NCAA coaches who feared a "free agency"
market in college athletics that was predicted to increase, as more
student-athletes were likely to discover the graduate transfer rule in
years to come. 10 5 Student-athletes sincere about transferring to a
new institution for graduate school can apply for such a transfer
under a waiver process still in effect despite the institutions' vote
overriding the graduate transfer rule. 10 6 The NCAA will most likely
grant waivers for applicants who are rising graduate student-athletes
and wish to transfer to another institution because their undergrad-
uate institution does not offer their degree of choice.' 0 7 The stu-
dent-athletes who took advantage of the graduate transfer rule
during the 2006-07 academic year were not affected by the override;
however, those wishing to make such a transfer after the summer of
102. See id. (concluding "[i]t is unfortunate that some now believe that the
interests of the athletic department and coach trump those of the student-athlete
at a critical time in their lives.").
103. See Alan Schmadtke, Recent Graduate Transfer Rule is Shot Down, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Jan. 7, 2007 (indicating vote of 196 to 83 in favor of override); see also
Hosick, supra note 9 (acknowledging vote's outcome despite student-athlete organ-
ization's advocacy in favor of maintaining rule).
104. See Hosick, supra note 9 (quoting Street's call to preserve graduate trans-
fer rule because benefits reaped by student-athletes outweigh potential for impact
on competition among institutions).
105. See id. (referring to executive director of National Association of Basket-
ball Coaches who predicted that students' knowledge of rule, along with escalation
of recruiting, would increase in coming years). Several months prior to the over-
ride vote, Grant Teaff, executive director of the American Football Coaches Associ-
ation, stressed his concern with the graduate transfer rule, stating that "[t]here is
an organizing effort to overturn this .... This is legislation that is not a good fit."
Dennis Dodd, Football Coaches Start Pushback Against New Transfer Rule, CBS SPORT-
sLINE.COM, May 26, 2006, http://www.sportsline.com/print/collegefootball/story/
9463380.
106. See Hosick, supra note 9 (quoting associate commissioner of Big Ten
Conference who believes "quality control" approach offered by waiver process is in
best interest of student-athletes).
107. See id. (suggesting likelihood of waiver grant to "student-athletes who
truly want[ ] to transfer for academic reasons").
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2007 will be subject to NCAA's transfer rules in place prior to the
temporary enactment of Proposal No. 2005-54.108
In preparation for the override vote, the NCAA research staff
initiated a survey asking Division I member institutions to respond
to questions based on student eligibility and exercise of the gradu-
ate transfer rule. 10 9 Ninety-two percent of Division I institutions re-
sponded to the survey, with roughly twenty-eight percent of those
institutions indicating that student-athletes enrolled as transfer stu-
dents in a graduate program during the 2006-07 academic year. 110
Of the twenty-eight percent of institutions enrolling transfers,
twenty-five out of 112 transfer graduate student-athletes partici-
pated in the NCAA's "revenue" sports.'1 ' Among those sports, foot-
ball had the largest number of graduate transfer student-athletes
taking advantage of the rule throughout 2006-07, followed by, in
declining order, men's basketball, women's basketball, and ice
hockey. 11 2 While a substantial majority of transferring graduate stu-
108. See 2006-07 NCAA Division I Legislative Proposals Question and Answer
Document, http://www2.ncaa.org/portal/legislationand_governance/rules-and
-bylaws/legislative actions.andjissues/2007_dljegislation-faq_.pdf (last visited
Oct. 24, 2007) ("If the adoption of the proposal is overridden, student-athletes
who transfer on or after August 1, 2007, will be subject to the legislation in place
prior to the adoption of Proposal No. 2005-54.").
109. See NCAA Transfer Eligibility Proposal, supra note 92 (indicating method
research staff used to conduct survey). The administrators of the survey provided
an overview of Proposal 2005-54 to preface their findings:
In April 2006, the Division I Board of Directors adopted Proposal
No. 2005-54, which created an exception to the transfer year-in-residence
rule and allows a student-athlete who has graduated with his or her un-
dergraduate degree to transfer to another institution and be immediately
eligible for financial aid, practice and competition, regardless of previous
transfer history, provided they have been accepted to a specific graduate
program at the second institution.
During the override period, the required number of member institu-
tions requested an override and the legislation will be voted on by the
membership at the 2007 NCAA Convention. In preparation for the up-
coming override vote and to help inform future decisions related to this
legislation, the following information has been prepared regarding the
use of the newly adopted exception during the 2006-07 academic year.
The NCAA research staff conducted a survey of the Division I mem-
bership via an online survey sent to compliance coordinators at all Divi-
sion I institutions and follow-up phone calls to non-respondents.
Id.
110. See id. (specifying that 217 of 301 responding institutions did not "have
incoming transfer student-athletes in any sport entering a graduate program who
will be competing in 2006-07").
111. See id. (noting that student-athletes participating in "men's and women's
basketball .... football, and men's ice hockey .... are those most significantly
impacted by the proposal").
112. See id. (estimating that sixteen football players is likely high figure be-
cause some would have been eligible under standard one-time transfer exception).
During the 2006-07 academic year, eight reported men's basketball players, one
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dent-athletes during the 2006-07 academic year did not participate
in "revenue" sports, therefore not requiring the use of the graduate
transfer rule, several high-profile college athletes did decide to take
advantage of the rule.' 1 3
D. The Graduate Transfer Rule in Use in 2006-07
Completing his undergraduate studies at the University of
Utah in August 2006, Ryan Smith maintained two years of football
eligibility as a result of "redshirting"114 his freshman year. 1 5 The
cornerback decided to take advantage of the graduate transfer rule
by applying to the University of Florida's Educational Leadership
reported women's basketball player, and no reported men's ice hockey players
transferred to new institutions under the graduate transfer rule. See NCAA Trans-
fer Eligibility Proposal, supra note 92.
113. See Knobler, NCAA Rule Change, supra note 1 (reporting NCAA's acknowl-
edgement of only twenty-five student-athletes who utilized graduate transfer rule,
including the four "most publicized": Ryan Smith, Richard Kovalcheck, Tyler
Krieg, and Kevin Kruger). The graduate transfer rule survey indicated the rarity of
the rule's use by student-athletes graduating from their undergraduate institution
with remaining eligibility:
According to data from the 2004-05 APR submission, 94,445 student-ath-
letes received athletics aid or were recruited for a NCAA Division I cham-
pionship sport team (were in the APR cohort) in the 2004-05 academic
year. It was reported that 14,457 of these student-athletes (15.3% of the
total) graduated during the 2004-05 year and that 4,830 (33.4% of all
graduates) graduated with remaining eligibility. Based on this informa-
tion, approximately two percent of graduates with remaining eligibility
continued their participation at an institution different from where they
graduated.
NCAA Transfer Eligibility Proposal, supra note 92. "APR" refers to Academic Pro-
gress Rate, an NCAA academic-reform initiative that reflects a "real-time assess-
ment of teams' academic performance" by collecting data and awarding points to
institutions' athletic teams whose student-athletes meet certain eligibility stan-
dards. NCAA, Defining Academic Reform, http://www2.ncaa.org/portal/academ-
icsandathletes/education.and research/academic_reform/definingacademic_
reform.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2007).
114. NCAA, Frequently-Asked Questions on Redshirts, Age Limits, and Grad-
uate Participation, http://www.ncaa.org/eligibility/faqs/faqseligibility-seasons.
html (last visited Oct. 24, 2007). A student-athlete "redshirts" when he or she does
not participate in athletic competition for one academic year, thus permitting the
student-athlete to maintain a season of eligibility. See id. "NCAA rules indicate that
any competition, regardless of time, during a season counts as one of your seasons
of competition in that sport." Id.
115. See Mark Long, Utah Grad Transfers to Florida, ASSOCIATED PREss, Aug. 8,
2006 (describing Smith's transfer to University of Florida ("Florida") after accept-
ance in graduate degree program). Smith redshirted the 2003 season at the Uni-
versity of Utah ("Utah") but started eighteen games throughout 2004 and 2005.
University of Florida Athletics: Ryan Smith Biography, http://www.gatorzone.
com/football/bios.php?year=2006&playerid=1l4 (last visited Oct. 24, 2007)
(identifying Smith as junior transfer).
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graduate program. 116 Interestingly, University of Florida head foot-
ball coach Urban Meyer, a vocal opponent of the graduate transfer
rule soon after its adoption, coached Smith at the University of
Utah during Smith's first season of eligibility in 2004.117 Smith's
first season on the University of Florida football team ended with
the institution's first national championship victory in a decade. 118
Two additional notable college football players took advantage
of the graduate transfer rule in 2006: Tyler Krieg and Richard
Kovalcheck. 119 Krieg received his undergraduate degree in four
years from Duke University, where he used three years of his ath-
letic eligibility playing offensive guard and one year redshirting. 120
The University of California, a school that originally recruited him
in high school, accepted Krieg into the institution's Master's in Ed-
ucation Program. 121 Deviating from the attitude of many other
NCAA Division I coaches, University of California coach Jeff
Tedford cautiously agrees with the graduate transfer rule in certain
cases, stating that "[i]f we had a fifth-year guy who wasn't com-
pletely happy, I would be OK with him transferring. Of course, you
116. See Long, Gators, Others Take Advantage, supra note 3 (describing Smith's
quick transfer from Utah to Florida). Prior to learning about the graduate transfer
rule, Smith anticipated transferring to Howard University, a Division I-AA institu-
tion, so he would not lose one of his remaining years of eligibility. See Kelly White-
side, Secondary Duo Primary Reason Florida 6-0; Thanks to New Rule, Transfer Smith,
Nelson in Position to Shine, USA TODAY, Oct. 12, 2006, at IC (detailing Smith's heavy
load of summer coursework to graduate from Utah).
117. See Long, Gators, Others Take Advantage, supra note 3 (noting dual motivat-
ing factors, coaching staff and interest in graduate degree program, which helped
Smith choose Florida for remaining seasons of athletic eligibility). Although
pleased with Smith on the Florida team, Coach Meyer nonetheless believes that
"anytime [sic] you use the word free agency in college football it's bad, and that's
what it is .... Ryan Smith was a free agent. That shouldn't happen in college
football." Whiteside, supra note 116.
118. See Roger Rubin, Gators Swamp OSU for Title: Take Grid Crown to Add to
Hoopla, DAiLY NEWS (N.Y.), Jan. 9, 2007, at 49 (discussing outcome of Florida's
national championship victory over Ohio State University); see also Whiteside, supra
note 116 (suggesting that Smith's transfer improved Florida's defense).
119. See Melick, supra note 94 (naming Krieg and Kovalcheck as student-ath-
letes immediately taking advantage of graduate transfer rule). Krieg and
Kovalcheck received their undergraduate degrees from Duke University ("Duke")
and the University of Arizona, respectively. See id.
120. See Heater, supra note 6 (indicating Duke's lack of success had much to
do with Krieg's initial desire to transfer to Division I-AA program with graduate
school where Krieg could be eligible to compete immediately).
121. See Doug Binder, Diploma Not End of Line, OREGONIAN, May 15, 2006, at
E01 (presenting Krieg's history with coaching staff at University of California); see
also Heater, supra note 6 (describing Krieg's adjustment to University of California,
athletically and academically). Before the 2006 season began, Krieg noted: "I feel
like a freshman all over again. I'm getting to know the guys and I'm learning a
new offense. Then there's the part of not knowing where anything is on campus."
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would hope that a guy in his fifth year would have an investment in
the program."' 22 Kovalcheck, a former starting quarterback with
two years of athletic eligibility remaining, transferred to Vanderbilt
University to study management at the graduate level after complet-
ing his undergraduate degree at the University of Arizona in three
years. ' 23
Football players were not the only prominent graduate stu-
dent-athletes taking advantage of the graduate transfer rule in
2006, as basketball player Kevin Kruger transferred from Arizona
State University to the University of Las Vegas after receiving his
bachelor's degree.1 24 Kruger admitted that he could not "see why
the rule was even proposed [or]... see too many players taking use
of it."125 The graduate transfer rule has allowed Kruger to play his
final year of eligibility during the 2006-07 college basketball season
under his father, coach Lon Kruger, an option which would not
have been possible under the NCAA's previous transfer rules re-
quiring a student-athlete in Kruger's situation to sit out a year of
eligibility before playing. 126
122. Heater, supra note 6 (quoting Tedford regarding acceptance of graduate
transfer rule in situations similar to Krieg's unhappiness at Duke).
123. See Bradley Handwerger & Kyle Veazey, Coaches See Few Changes from New
Transfer Rule: Abuses Aren't Expected Now, DECATUR DAILY (Ala.), July 27, 2006
(describing Kovalcheck's taking advantage of graduate transfer rule); see alsoJack
Carey, College Football Coaches Oppose Rule Easing Transfers, USA TODAY, June 5, 2006,
at 3C (noting amount of time it took Kovalcheck, including summer coursework,
to receive his undergraduate degree). Bobby Johnson, Vanderbilt University's
football coach, who has a rare favorable opinion regarding the graduate transfer
rule stated:
If you've got a guy on your team ... producing at a great rate, I doubt if
he's going to want to go somewhere else and play football.... Plus, he's
got to graduate, then he's got to be accepted in that other school, and
he's got to get a release from his previous school.
Handwerger, supra. "[I]f a guy can get to a good graduate school and finish out
one last year of eligibility, why not let him do it?" Higgins, supra note 3.
124. See Matt Youmans, Coach's Son Bolsters Rebels, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., July 8,
2006, at IC (naming Kruger as highest-profile player to use graduate transfer
rule); see also An Academic Incentive, LAS VEGAS REv.-j.,July 19, 2006, at 8B (opining
that coaches who criticize graduate transfer rule "have the freedom to leave their
schools and lead other teams on a moment's notice.").
125. Matt Youmans, Rule is Blessing for New Rebel Kruger, LAs VEGAS REv. J., July
16, 2006, at IC (quoting Kruger on his skepticism of graduate transfer rule's use).
126. See Michael Schwartz, Former ASU Guard Kruger Now Playing for His Dad at
UNLV, Asuz. DAILY WILDCAT, Nov. 28, 2006 (illustrating graduate transfer rule pro-
vided for father-son reunion at UNLV, yet acknowledging rule's disfavor by "af-
fected schools").
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E. The Free Agency Model in Professional Athletics
Athletes participating in the four major professional sports
leagues (i.e., Major League Baseball, the National Football League,
the National Basketball Association, and the National Hockey
League) become parties to personal services contracts with teams in
a number of different situations.1 2 7 Depending on the sports
league and the mechanics of its respective "drafting" process, an
athlete, with the help of an agent, initially sacrifices their playing
rights to a particular team for a specific period of time. 128 At this
point, an athlete may decide to sign a player contract with the team
or may attempt to re-enter a future draft hoping to be selected by
another franchise.1 29 Professional athletes who satisfy a required
amount of playing time in their league and are aware of the im-
pending expiration of their player contracts may wish to obtain
"free agency" status, of which there are two types: unrestricted and
restricted. 130
"Unrestricted" free agency indicates that a professional athlete
is essentially free from all contractual ties to their former team.' 3 '
As a "restricted" free agent, a professional athlete may negotiate
and enter into a new contract with another team in the league but
may still be retained by their old team if it matches the new team's
offer. 132 Thus, professional athletes prefer to be "unrestricted" free
agents because that situation affords them an ideal bargaining posi-
tion and an opportunity to be lucratively compensated. 13 3 Profes-
127. See Michael A. McCann, It's Not About the Money: The Role of Preferences,
Cognitive Biases, and Heuristics Among Professional Athletes, 71 BROOKLYN L. Rrv. 1459,
1484-85 (2006) (presenting notion of professional athletic "employment" by sports
teams).
128. See id. at 1486 (indicating draft processes in four major professional
leagues have specific rules on "exclusive property" rights of athletes). For exam-
ple, an athlete chosen in a draft typically is under contractual control of the draft-
ing team for a set period time, usually at least one year. See id. Drafts in
professional sports serve as "the exclusive entrance for amateur players into profes-
sional sports." Id.
129. See id. (revealing variations and intricacies of drafts and subsequent sign-
ing processes in different professional sports leagues, as well as on agreements
established by players' unions).
130. See id. at 1487 (suggesting motivation behind becoming free agent is
maximizing "earning potential").
131. See id. (defining "unrestricted" free agency and deeming it "optimal bar-
gaining position" of professional athlete).
132. See id. (detailing "restricted" free agency where teams may receive draft
picks as compensation if one of their players signs with another team).
133. See Stephen M. Yoost, Comment, The National Hockey League and Salary
Arbitration: Timefor A Line Change, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 485, 495 (2006)
(indicating exponential increase of NHL players' salaries over ten-year period de-
spite league's declining popularity). Typically, professional athletes will arrive at
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sional teams with higher payrolls, or more availability under a
league-mandated salary cap, are most often able to offer the more
impressive contracts to free agents; however, in some cases profes-
sional athletes are drawn to a team's opportunity for success and
not a more lucrative contract.13 4
As noted above, in Tanaka, the Ninth Circuit discussed Mackey
v. NFL, a 1977 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit ("Eighth Circuit") .135 In Mackey, an NFL player successfully
sued NFL owners arguing that the "Rozelle Rule,"1 36 "requir[ing] a
team signing a player from another team to work out a 'mutually
satisfactory arrangement' with the former team," constituted an un-
reasonable restraint of trade violating the Sherman Act. 137 In the
year that the rule was enacted, only thirty-four of 176 eligible play-
ers were able to sign contracts with new teams.1 38
The Eighth Circuit, in rejecting the NFL owners' argument
that the Rozelle Rule was justifiable on business grounds, applied a
"rule of reason" analysis to determine whether the Rozelle Rule vio-
lated the Sherman Act.' 39 Because the lower court acknowledged
that the Rozelle Rule was not "essential to the maintenance of com-
petitive balance," the Eighth Circuit determined that the Rule did
not satisfy rule of reason analysis.' 40
Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit held that the Rozelle Rule
constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade under the Sherman
Act because "it was overly broad, unlimited in duration, unaccom-
panied by procedural safeguards, and employed in conjunction
free agency eligibility at the peaks of their careers, a period of time arguably lim-
ited to only a few years. See McCann, supra note 127, at 1490 (noting "relatively
brief earnings curve" for majority of professional athletes).
134. See McCann, supra note 127, at 1504 (discussing professional basketball
player Alonzo Mourning's preference to play for teams with championship poten-
tial over possibility of earning extra millions of dollars on less successful teams).
135. For a discussion of the Tanaka case, see supra notes 77-91 and accompa-
nying text.
136. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 611 (8th Cir. 1977) (indicating that
"ostensible purposes of the rule are to maintain competitive balance among the
NFL teams and protect the clubs' investment in scouting, selecting and developing
players.").
137. Scott E. Backman, NFL Players Fight for Their Freedom: The History of Free
Agency in the NFL, 9 SPORTS LAw. J. 1, 10 (2002) (quoting Mackey, 543 F.2d at 611).
138. See id. (suggesting owners' satisfaction with Rozelle Rule's restrictive
result).
139. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 620 ("The focus of an inquiry under the Rule of
Reason is whether the restraint imposed is justified by legitimate business pur-
poses, and is no more restrictive than necessary.").
140. See id. at 621-22 (acknowledging league's "strong and unique interest in
maintaining competitive balance among its teams").
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with other anticompetitive practices .... ",141 Most importantly, the
Eighth Circuit minimized the importance of NFL owners' claims
that such a ruling would hinder the league's ability to maintain rela-
tively equal competition among its teams; the court concluded that
without the Rozelle Rule, there would be "no immediate or future
disruptive effects on the League."'142
F. Educational Hindrance
Another potential avenue worth consideration when evaluating
the graduate transfer rule is the claim of educational malpractice,
"a tort theory beloved of commentators, but not of courts. ' 143
More specifically, a plaintiff bringing a suit against an institution, or
an organization such as the NCAA, may allege that the quality of
the education they received was poor or that certain opportunities
to make the education more meaningful were unavailable. 144 One
predominant problem regarding this issue is the perception that
institutions, particularly those with dominant athletic programs that
find substantial success at the lucrative championship levels of cer-
tain sports, do not provide their student-athletes with adequate aca-
demic means.' 45 Such institutions, despite their often-stated
principal goal of fostering academic achievement, arguably have
141. Id. at 621.
142. Backman, supra note 137, at 16. The Eighth Circuit, referencing the
lower court's determinations, stated:
As to the clubs' investment in player development costs, Judge Larson
found that these expenses are similar to those incurred by other busi-
nesses, and that there is no right to compensation for this type of invest-
ment. With respect to player continuity, the court found that elimination
of the Rozelle Rule would affect all teams equally in that regard; that it
would not lead to a reduction in the quality of play; and that even assum-
ing that it would, that fact would notjustify the Rozelle Rule's anticompe-
titive effects. As to competitive balance and the consequences which
would flow from abolition of the Rozelle Rule, Judge Larson found that
the existence of the Rozelle Rule has had no material effect on competi-
tive balance in the NFL. Even assuming that the Rule did foster competi-
tive balance, the court found that there were other legal means available
to achieve that end - e.g., the competition committee, multiple year
contracts, and special incentives.
Mackey, 543 F.2d at 621.
143. Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1327 (N.D. I11. 1990), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992).
144. See Monica L. Emerick, Comment, The University/Student-Athlete Relation-
ship: Duties Giving Rise to a Potential Educational Hindrance Claim, 44 UCLA L. Rrv.
865, 869 (1997) (describing educational hindrance as complaint alleging institu-
tion's conduct, either active or passive, resulted in unfavorable effect on educa-
tional opportunity).
145. See id. at 875 (presenting findings of NCAA's Knight Commission that
athletic aspirations are placed above educational value of academic programs).
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been unable to adequately reconcile that goal with the additionally
important notions of athletic success, notoriety, and
marketability.146
Challenging the NCAA, as opposed to individual institutions,
on this issue may lead to success because of the organization's em-
phasis on amateurism and educational opportunity for student-ath-
letes studying at the collegiate level.1 47 For example, the NCAA
Constitution specifies requirements relating to student-athletes' ac-
ademic performances. 148 One scholar has indicated, however, that
the NCAA has thus far failed to adequately balance the conflicting
goals of strong athletics and extensive academic options for stu-
dent-athletes. 149
III. ANALYSiS
In order to examine the issue of whether a student-athlete may
challenge the NCAA's repeal of the graduate transfer rule, let us
hypothesize a situation involving Richie, a highly-regarded defen-
sive tackle who plays football for a consistently successful "power-
house" Division I institution.1 50 Following a successful high school
career, both on the football field and in the classroom, Richie de-
termined that attending South-Central Louisiana State University
("SCLSU") would further his dual goals of pursuing football at a
highly competitive collegiate level and owning his own business in
the near future. Richie made numerous contributions to his team
throughout his freshman season; however, a knee injury forced him
to redshirt the following season. 151 Despite the injury, Richie ex-
celled academically toward a management degree, and with the
146. See id. at 878 (indicating that institutions often must choose between
"winning and educational values").
147. For a discussion of amateurism, see supra notes 45-65 and accompanying
text.
148. See NCAA Const., supra note 27, at art. 2.5 (specifying fulfillment of
"sound academic standards"). "The admission, academic standing and academic
progress of student-athletes shall be consistent with the policies and standards
adopted by the institution for the student body in general." Id.
149. See Emerick, supra note 144, at 883 (speculating that from NCAA's per-
spective financial benefits stemming from successful athletic programs outweigh
academic endeavors).
150. See Knobler, NCAA Rule Change, supra note 1 (detailing one student-ath-
lete's views on graduate transfer rule and rule's impact on his educational aspira-
tions at graduate level). These circumstances and the hypothetical Richie are
loosely based on the situation of Georgia Institute of Technology ("Georgia Tech")
student-athlete Darryl Richard, who began his undergraduate career at Georgia
Tech in 2004.
151. See Player Bio: Darryl Richard, http://ramblinwreck.cstv.com/sports/m-
footbl/mtt/richard darrylO0.html (on file with author) (mentioning Richard's
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help of summer classes was able to graduate in just three years. Re-
turning to the football field following rehabilitation of his knee,
Richie participated in only the second of his allotted four years of
athletic eligibility. 152 Richie received his undergraduate degree in
the spring of that year and was eager to immediately pursue a
master's degree in business administration ("MBA") while continu-
ing to play football. 153
A student-athlete member of SCLSU's men's cross-country
team alerted Richie to a recently-enacted and rather controversial
NCAA rule allowing student-athletes who have completed their un-
dergraduate studies to transfer to another Division I institution to
pursue a graduate degree and immediately continue their athletic
eligibility without missing a beat.' 5 4 Unfortunately, Division I insti-
tutions recently met at the NCAA's annual convention and re-
pealed the graduate transfer rule, seemingly appeasing calls from
concerned coaches and athletic directors labeling the rule prob-
lematic and an invitation to be disloyal to the institution that re-
cruited the student-athlete. 155 Due to the repealed rule, if Richie
transfers into an MBA program at another institution he may have
to sacrifice one of his two remaining years of athletic eligibility.
Richie applied to SCLSU's MBA program and would gladly enroll
there if accepted; however, gaining entrance is a long shot because
the school typically requires several years of full-time work experi-
ence from its applicants. 56
Richie's available options in the wake of the NCAA institutions'
decision to overturn the graduate transfer rule are three-fold: 1)
continue at SCLSU with his remaining two years of athletic eligibil-
ity while enrolled in another of the institution's graduate programs;
2) attend an MBA program at another institution with a competi-
tive football team, while being forced to sacrifice one year of ath-
redshirt season caused by reconstructive knee surgery prior to his second year of
play).
152. For a further discussion of "redshirting" and the mechanics of athletic
eligibility, see supra note 114.
153. See Knobler, NCAA Rule Change, supra note 1 ("Georgia Tech defensive
tackle Darryl Richard wants to play two more years of major college football and
earn an MBA at the same time.")
154. For a further discussion of the graduate transfer rule's origin and frame-
work, see supra notes 92-102 and accompanying text.
155. For a further discussion of the graduate transfer rule's repeal, see supra
notes 103-13 and accompanying text.
156. See Knobler, NCAA Rule Change, supra note 1 (quoting Georgia Tech Col-
lege of Management admission director's statement indicating only five percent of
admitted students arrive in MBA program immediately after receiving bachelor's
degree).
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letic eligibility; or 3) attend an MBA program at a Division II or
Division III institution and resume his collegiate football career im-
mediately for two more years. 157 Unfortunately, none of these
choices are exactly optimal, as Richie believes he should not be pe-
nalized for wanting to immediately begin his studies in an MBA pro-
gram while continuing to play competitive Division I football. In
short, the NCAA has hampered Richie's pursuit of his academic
and athletic goals by necessitating that he consider less attractive
options because of the graduate transfer rule's repeal.'15
A. Refutation of Free Agency Claims
As mentioned throughout this Note, one majorjustification for
the repeal of the graduate transfer rule voiced by non-student-ath-
letes, particularly NCAA coaches and athletic directors of member
institutions, is that allowing graduate students to transfer will gener-
ate a market of "free agent" talent available only to the most attrac-
tive athletic programs.1 59 In the hypothetical situation, it is highly
likely that Richie's football coach at SCLSU would be apprehensive
about allowing one of his most capable players, who has only pro-
vided the school with two years of service, to transfer and immedi-
ately become a possible division opponent. 160 Using terminology
linked to professional sports, a rising graduate student-athlete may
reflect an "unrestricted" free agent because after receiving their un-
dergraduate degree they would be free to transfer elsewhere with-
out their undergraduate institution interfering.161 While the
motivations of student-athletes will differ, it is likely that their inten-
tions to utilize the graduate transfer rule throughout the 2006-07
season stemmed from their desires to both reap the benefits of a
graduate degree and open a new chapter of their athletic ca-
157. See id. (providing other options available to Richards if he is not accepted
into Georgia Tech's MBA program).
158. See id. (noting Richard's intention to obtain his MBA, "if not from Tech
than [sic] from somewhere else.").
159. For a discussion of coaches and athletic directors' concerns urging the
NCAA's repeal of the graduate transfer rule, see supra notes 105-13 and accompa-
nying text.
160. See Doyel, supra note 2 (quoting one Big East Conference coach's state-
ment that graduate transfer rule is "the dumbest rule I've ever heard.").
161. For a discussion of the differences between "restricted" and "un-
restricted" free agency, see supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text. One could
argue, of course, that a student-athlete's undergraduate institution may liken the
situation to one of "restricted" free agency, perhaps granting that institution an
advantage over other potential institutions where the student-athlete could pursue
graduate studies.
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reers. 162 Therefore, one could posit that the "earning potential"
motivating professional athletes anxious to pursue their free agency
can be analogized to a more elaborate student-athlete's balancing
approach, taking into account not only the likelihood of athletic
success, but also a "total package" that affords them a quality grad-
uate level education.163
In Mackey,164 the Eighth Circuit was not persuaded by the
NFL's competitive league rationale for implementation of the "Ro-
zelle" Rule and deemed the rule non-essential to maintaining com-
petition and to be more restrictive than necessary. 165 Applied to
the graduate transfer rule, the NCAA clearly has an interest in pro-
tecting student-athletes' well-being.1 66 Compared to the profes-
sional free agency situation, placing a check upon graduate student-
athletes wishing to transfer institutions appears to be an overly re-
strictive means of maintaining competition among NCAA institu-
tions. 16 7 Arguably, the repeal of the graduate transfer rule reflects
the NCAA effectively dropping the ball when it comes to the organi-
zation's principle, indicated in its Constitution and its Operating
Bylaws, of providing an environment capable of fostering a student-
athlete's overall educational experience. Similarly, in Mackey, the
Eighth Circuit's holding which minimized the NFL owners' cries
that the end of the "Rozelle Rule" would erase any sort of competi-
tive balance is relevant to the argument that allowing rising gradu-
ate student-athletes to transfer without penalty may have a
detrimental effect on athletic programs' abilities to recruit student-
athletes.' 68 Even NCAA coaches opposed to the graduate transfer
rule saw firsthand in 2006 that the rule's implementation benefited
athletic programs and student-athletes' educations in ways which
162. See Melick, supra note 94 (noting coaches' panic that rule "allows players
who have done everything right to leave for a better opportunity somewhere
else.").
163. See Davis, supra note 7, at 6 (opining that vast majority of student-athletes
know value of education, not possibility of becoming professional athlete, will be
ultimate reward of collegiate experience).
164. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 611 (8th Cir. 1976).
165. See id. at 621-22 (acknowledging district court's findings on issue of
NFL's need for competitive balance applied to rule of reason analysis).
166. See NCAA Const., supra note 27, at art. 2.2 (stressing importance of main-
taining well-being through overall educational experience, diversity, health and
safety, among other principles).
167. For a discussion of the rationale behind the NCAA's decision to repeal
the graduate transfer rule, see supra notes 103-13 and accompanying text.
168. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 621-22 (rejecting argument that NFL team own-
ers' need to "recoup player development costs" supports restraining free agency of
professional athletes).
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otherwise would not have been possible or which would have re-
quired sacrificing a year of athletic eligibility. 169 In addition, even if
assuming, arguendo, the graduate transfer rule did cause coaching
staffs to be concerned about potentially losing their rising graduate
student-athletes, the Eighth Circuit in Mackey acknowledged that re-
moving anti-competitive restraints affecting player movement
among a league's professional teams would not "lead to a reduction
in the quality of play. ' 170 The fact that some in the NCAA commu-
nity believe the graduate transfer rule would create a free agency
market should not insulate the organization from legal critique and
analogy to situations in the professional sports environment, which
lacks amateurism ideals. 171 Rather, the voices of student-athletes
claiming unfairness should survive anti-competition scrutiny.
B. Potential of Educational Hindrance
The unique effects of repealing the graduate transfer rule ad-
mittedly do not impact a great deal of NCAA student-athletes. 72
While student-athletes are hindered because they cannot immedi-
ately transfer and compete, concerns also arise related to the educa-
tional opportunities student-athletes may have to forego when
weighing their athletic and educational obligations at the graduate
level. 173 With regard to NCAA institutions with dominant athletic
programs, one could argue that many do not provide their student-
athletes with adequate academic means.1 74 Collegiate institutions,
regardless of the amateurism standards imposed by the NCAA, have
done a poor job of providing adequate educations, which is often
overshadowed by what athletic programs may perceive as the more
important notion of athletic success. 175 Bringing an educational
169. See Long, Gators, Others Take Advantage, supra note 3 (detailing Coach
Meyer's disapproval of nile despite receiving quality cornerback Ryan Smith be-
cause of it).
170. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 621.
171. For a discussion of the NCAA's principle of amateurism, see supra notes
45-65 and accompanying text.
172. For a discussion of student-athlete eligibility and use of graduate transfer
rule throughout 2006-07 academic year, see supra notes 92-126 and accompanying
text.
173. See Emerick, supra note 144, at 869-70 (indicating institution's potential
liability when action or failure to act results in degradation of educational
experience).
174. See id. at 875 (presenting findings of NCAA's Knight Commission regard-
ing placement of athletic aspirations above educational value of academic
programs).
175. See id. at 878 (discussing how institutions often must choose between
"winning and educational values").
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hindrance claim against the NCAA, as opposed to against individual
institutions, may be successful because the organization focuses on
the pursuit of educational opportunity for student-athletes. 176 Such
a challenge may only receive a lukewarm reception, however, as
courts have been unenthusiastic to embrace educational hindrance
claims.' 77 Admittedly, student-athletes unable to take advantage of
the now-repealed graduate transfer rule likely do have viable gradu-
ate-level educational opportunities at their undergraduate
institutions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because it has been repealed, the graduate transfer rule may
reflect a failed experiment-a tinkering with the NCAA's compli-
cated transfer rules. 178 Several examples of the rule's use during
the 2006-07 academic year indicate the benefits of allowing gradu-
ate student-athletes to choose where they wish to use their athletic
eligibility. 179 Coaches at the collegiate level are permitted to
choose where they coach, and often their decisions to pursue more
lucrative employment contracts cannot be compared with a stu-
dent-athlete's decision to find their preferred course of graduate
study.180 Unless NCAA athletic programs have a change of heart
regarding the graduate transfer rule, the organization's underlying
goal of amateurism will continue to fall short of being achieved;
however, this could be remedied by providing for a trial period
longer than one year to determine the rule's effects on the "mar-
176. For a discussion of amateurism, see supra notes 45-65 and accompanying
text.
177. See Emerick, supra note 144, at 870 n.23 (indicating that "courts have
recognized scholarship agreements between student-athletes and their universities
as constituting contracts.").
178. See Schmadtke, supra note 103 (quoting North Carolina-Charlotte ath-
letic representative that "[flear [of the rule] drove the circumstances and won").
179. For a discussion of the graduate transfer rule's use while implemented,
see supra notes 114-26 and accompanying text.
180. SeeJenkins, supra note 50, at 40 (commenting on Duke men's basketball
coach Mike Krzyzewski's million dollar signing bonus and Nike stock options he
received for agreeing to continue coaching Duke basketball team).
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ket" of rising graduate student-athletes seeking to transfer
institutions. 181
William C. Mariin*
181. See Hosick, supra note 9 (quoting SAAC representative pleading with
NCAA institutions to not allow impact of rule on competition to outweigh life-long
benefits of continuing education at graduate level).
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LawJournal. J.D. Candidate, Villanova University School of Law, 2008; B.A., Syra-
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